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PERSISTENCE OF OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE AND 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE AMONG DIVERSIFIED FIRMS: 
THE IMPACT OF PAST PERFORMANCE, EFFICIENT INTEGRAL CAPITAL 







The research domain that attempts to study the relationship between diversification and 
performance has not yet reached definitive and  interpretable findings, and recent studies 
challenge the existence of a “diversification discount” and explain it partially by a data 
artefact. None of these studies centered their research on the question: does a specific 
performance pattern exist among diversified firms? This research aims to identify persistence in 
performance heterogeneity by measuring the shareholder value creation of diversified firms 
using alternative indicators other than the excess value methodology. It also aims to measure 
the impact on the performance according to the degree of efficiency of the internal capital 
market and the degree of relatedness among business segments. A sample of 164 diversified 
firms with turnover greater than $1 billion during the 1999-2006 period is examined. Because 
of the presence of the firm’s specific effect and the length of the time series, the persistence 
performance is tested through the instrumental variables (IV) system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) dynamic panel data and the persistence of shareholder value creation, and 
destruction is estimated according to different estimators from top tercile and lower tercile 
portfolios of diversified firms. Some diversified firms persistently create value as well as beat 
the market index while others persistently underperform. Finally, if the efficiency of the 
internal capital market gives certain explanatory power of the performance pattern, but limited 
compared to the past performance, important insights might be drawn from the findings that 
diversified firms with segments in many unrelated industries perform better than others in few 
industries or with a high number of segments; hence, the inverted-U curvilinear relationship 
between diversification and performance is here not confirmed. 
1 Researcher, IESE 
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The research domain that attempts to study the relationship between diversification and 
performance has not yet reached definitive and  interpretable findings to determine if 
diversification strategy creates or destroys value. Despite this lack of consensus, empirical 
results have identified mechanisms to understand the “dark and bright sides”
1 of the 
relationship between diversification and value creation, and the recent M&A wave of 2006
2 
indicates that firms still consider diversification as a path of value creation. In the field of 
finance, all of the studies centered on the following research question: is a single segment 
better off alone or within a conglomerate? Hence the research question was to identify if “on 
average” diversification creates or destroys value through a “chop-shop” approach. Lang and 
Stulz (1994) and Berg and Ofek (1995) found a consistent diversification discount, but later 
other authors argue that the discount is attributable to factors other than diversification (Campa 
and Kedia, 2002; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a), and that previous 
attempts to assess the diversification discount in U.S. stock markets are flawed because of their 
reliance on reported business segments, and finally diversification creates value (Villalonga, 
2004b). In the field of strategic management, the research question is focused on the 
identification of the “type of diversification,” comparing diversified firms among them rather 
                                              
1 Khanna and Tice (2001) published their empirical findings on the positive effects related to the internal capital 
market explaining shareholder value creation under the title, “The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets.” In 
contrast, Sharfstein and Stein (2002) published empirical findings on the “pervert relationships” between shareholder 
value destruction and the internal capital market under the title, “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets.” In both 
studies, empirical findings are consistent and developed in different contexts and focus on different phenomenon, 
hence they cannot be considered in competition. The conclusion that can be drawn is that there is not a ”fixed 
effect“ or phenomenon that ”ex-ante“ allows to identify if the diversification per se creates or destroys value. It can 
be both and depends on how the specifics mechanisms related to this type of firm are maximized and the drawbacks 
minimized. The role of the top management seems to be strongly critical in the determination of the relationship 
diversification and value creation. 
2 Financial Times, December 21, 2006, “M&A in 2006 Beats Tech Boom.”  
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than developing a benchmark based on single segment firms. Palich, Cardinal, and Miller 
(2000), studying 55 quantitative studies of the diversification performance linkage, confirm that 
this linkage appears to have an inverted-U curvilinear relationship with performance, but the 
choice of measurement method of diversity or “relatedness” presents scholars a degree of 
subjectivity (Martin and Sayrak, 2003) hence the possibility to influence research results (Hall 
and John, 1994; Robin and Wieserma, 2003). 
In this paper, rather than pursue an additional analysis to determine if “on average” 
diversification creates or destroys value, or to determine a representative index of “relatedness,” 
it examines the tales of the distribution of the diversified firms to discover if there exists a 
specific performance pattern among diversified firms. When studying if diversification creates 
or destroys value, it seems more appropriate to take inspiration from the performance pattern of 
private equity (LBO): both models of firms follow a value maximization behavior, target poor 
performing companies, possess higher management capabilities than single segment firms to 
improve productivity, transfer knowledge management among segments of business, and 
finally benefit from high availability of funds for investments from both internal and external 
sources. 
LBO performance has a specific performance pattern compared to mutual funds, leading to the 
question if “on average” the risk-adjusted performance of LBO is better to mutual funds; this is 
not probably the most important question to ask when making investments, but rather its 
performance persistence (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
This research aims to identify the persistence in performance heterogeneity by measuring the 
shareholder value creation of diversified firms using portfolio management techniques as an 
alternative indicator rather than the excess value methodology, and finally it aims to measure 
the impact on performance according to the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market 
and to the degree of relatedness among business segments. 
An important persistence of performance is found in both accounting and market valuation 
measurements: some diversified firms persistently outperform their industry and beat the 
financial markets, while others persistently underperform. This research contributes to the 
understanding of the relationship between diversification and value creation or destruction 
through the perspective of the persistence of performance among diversifiers. Through this 
perspective, diversification can be considered as a consistent and persistence strategy to 
generate shareholder value that goes far beyond the degree of efficiency in the funds allocation 
process and the degree of relatedness among business segments. 
Review of the Literature 
The research domain that attempts to study the relationship between diversification and 
performance has not yet reached definitive and  interpretable findings to determine if 
diversification strategy creates or destroys value despite the substantial number of empirical 
studies in both finance and strategic management (Martin and Sayrak, 2003).  
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Finance literature 
In finance literature most of these studies were centered on the research question: is a segment 
of business better off alone or within a conglomerate? Does this enables researchers and 
scholars to determine if “on average” diversification creates or destroys shareholder value? 
Business segments within a conglomerate are supposed to benefit from the internal capital 
market, the headquarters is considered an effective financial intermediary through “winner 
picking” behavior (Williamson, 1975; Stain, 1997): the business segment benefits of higher 
rights control over the projects allowing for better information flow, higher assets re-
deployability and relaxation of credit constraints (Gertner, Sharfstein, and Stein, 1994). These 
benefits are supposed to offset the internal capital market flip side identified as the reduction of 
manager entrepreneurial incentive, the effort dilution factor and agency argumentation of on-
the-job-consumption (Jensen, 1986) in which projects receive a lower level of funding than 
they could obtain standing alone because of the cross-subsidiarization in which good 
performing divisions subside poor performing divisions destroying shareholder value (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995; Denis, Danis, and Sarin, 1997; Raian, Servaes, and Zingales, 
2000; Sharfstein and Stain, 2000). 
In order to answer that specific question, Lang and Stulz (1994), through a firm’s industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q and Berg and Ofek (1995) through an excess value methodology, find that 
the value of the diversified firms is “on average” lower than the comparable portfolios of 
specialized firms, finding a diversification discount explained by inefficiency of the internal 
capital market. They conclude that diversification is not a successful path to higher 
performance because the value of the diversified firm is less than the sum of its parts by an 
average discount factor of 13-15% (Berg and Ofek, 1995). 
The method of portfolios of specialized firms or “pure play firms” (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg 
and Ofek, 1995) suffers from several drawbacks, such as the sample selection (Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a), measurement errors and data artefact (Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Villalonga, 2004b; Emms and Kale, 2006; 
Stowe and Xing, 2006). Once these biases are corrected, the diversification discount becomes 
very small or even turns into a premium. Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) find 
that the diversification discount was explained by endogeneity (diversifying firms are poor 
performers prior to conglomeration) and once the endogeneity is corrected, they find empirical 
evidence that diversification might be a value-enhancing strategy. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf 
(2002) and Emms and Kale (2006) found that target firms were already discounted firms, hence 
the comparison between divisions of conglomerate and stand-alone firms overestimates the 
magnitude of the diversification discount. Mansi and Reeb (2002) argue that measurements of 
the firm’s value based on book value of debt would systematically undervalue diversified firms,
3 
and Stowe and Xing (2006), using the excess value methodology, find that part of the 
diversification discount was explained by controlling the firm’s growth opportunities,
4 
                                              
3 They argue that diversification leads to lower firm’s risk and found that book value of debt is a more downward 
biased proxy of the market value of debt for diversified relative to undiversified firms. 
4 Stowe and Xing (2006) used the excess value method of Berg and Ofek (1995), but the single segment counterpart 
is the firm in the same industry that has the closest growth opportunity (proxy for growth opportunity is the ratio 
capital expenditure to total asset).  
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concluding that growth opportunities might account for at least one part of the diversification 
discount. Villalonga (2004), using excess value methodology, finds that the diversification 
discount was due to a data artefact (over-evaluation of the assets and sales industry multiples). 
She merges the BITS database on business segments with Compustat, and the discount becomes 
a premium. Following this line of empirical findings, Santalo and Becerra (2008) show that the 
effect of diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries: diversified firms 
perform better in industries with a small number of non-diversified competitors. 
If evidence at market valuation level is inconclusive, when the unit of analysis is shifted from 
shareholder value to firm’s productivity (proxy of performance), research has also produced 
mixed results, and in addition, the number of studies is limited. Schoar (2002) finds that plants 
within diversified firms are, on average, more productive than plants in comparable single 
segment firms about a coefficient of 7%. However, in this process of becoming more diversified, 
firms suffer a net reduction in productivity because of the “new toy effects”: the productivity 
increase of newly-acquired plants does not offset the decrease in productivity of the incumbent 
plants. In contrast, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find, consistent with a negative excess value 
of diversified firms, that productivity of conglomerate firms is lower than single-segment firms 
of similar size, but this difference was mainly driven by smaller peripheral segments that show 
significantly lower productivity than do main segments.
5 
Strategic management literature 
In contrast to finance, in strategic management field, most studies were centered on the 
research question that certain types of diversification lead to distinctive competence (Rumelt, 
1974, 1982; Bettis, 1981; Palepu, 1985; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). Here the research 
question is focused on the identification of the “type of diversification” comparing diversified 
firms among them rather than developing a benchmark based on single segment firms building 
“pure play firm” (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995). Palich, Cardinal, and Miller 
(2000), studying 55 quantitative studies of the diversification performance linkage, confirm that 
this linkage appears to have an inverted-U curvilinear relationship with performance: a positive 
effect occurs as firms move from a single business strategy to a related diversification strategy, 
but negative effects occur as firms move from a related strategy to an unrelated strategy. The 
key question here seems to be the choice of measurement method of diversity or “relatedness” 
that influences research results (Hall and John; 1994; Robin and Wieserma, 2003). Attempts to 
measure the extent and type of firm diversity have followed two main avenues: on one extreme 
there are simple but objective, and replicable indicators (e.g. continuous measurement 
developed from SIC code like Hertfindahl index) but with the shortcoming not to fully tap into 
the dimension of relatedness, and on the other extreme, there are more sophisticated indicators 
that are able to represent in more detail the degree of relatedness among business units. To this 
second line of approach their relatedness constructs are based on cross-business synergies 
arising from: e.g. product relatedness (Rumelt, 1974) manufacturing relatedness (John and 
Harrison, 1999), technological relatedness (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999), R&D 
relatedness (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991) marketing relatedness (Capron and Hulland, 
1999), advertising relatedness (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), managerial relatedness (Ilinitch 
and Zeithaml, 1995; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), human resources relatedness (Farjoun, 1994), 
                                              
5 Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) attempt to explain this difference arguing that in their measure of productivity, a 
fixed effect is included and that samples are different.  
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and resource-based view relatedness (Markides and Williamson, 1994). Robin and Wieserma 
(2003) raised the issue related to the “content validity”
6 of the related diversification indexes, 
and Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005), point out the difference between potential relatedness 
and actual relatedness: potential synergies may not be exploited by the firm, hence when using 
potential relatedness as proxy for actual relatedness, the interpretation of results might be 
difficult. 
To summarize, in both fields of research, empirical findings that attempt to answer the question 
(i) if a business segment is better off within a diversified firm or standing alone and (ii) what 
type of relatedness increases firm performance, have not yet completely reached their objective. 
But on the other hand, they have highlighted consistent and specific characteristics of 
diversified firms. 
On “the bright sid,”, diversified firms benefit from an efficient
7 internal capital market 
(Williamson, 1975; Shin and Stulz, 1988; Stain, 1997) and from cheaper access to the external 
source of funds (Mansi and Reeb, 2002, 2006; Peyer, 2002), especially in situations when there 
exists a higher information asymmetry between the corporate headquarter and the external 
capital market (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Khanna and Tice, 2002; Campello, 2002; Guedji 
and Scharfstein, 2004; Hyland and Diltz, 2002). In addition, diversified firms that follow a 
neoclassic value maximization model by  searching for new growth opportunities (Goold and 
Campbell, 1987; Chandler, 1991; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; 
Schoar, 2002; Stowe and Xinx, 2006), maximize synergies across business (Palich, Cardinal, 
and Miller, 2000), acquire poor performing firms (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002; Emms 
and Kale, 2006) and improve the productivity of target companies through higher management 
capabilities than single-segment firms (Schoar, 2002).
8 
On “the dark side” of diversification, empirical findings have shown its drawbacks (in terms of 
value destruction) especially driven by agency argumentations that deviate funds allocation to 
their best uses (Jensen, 1986; Denis, Danis, and Sarin, 1997; Sharfstein and Stain, 2000; Raian, 
Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Hyland and Dilz, 2002), or by the development of business 
segments with the absence of potential synergies (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000) or because 
the firm is too big and becomes unmanageable (Stain, 1997). 
Research Question and Structure of the Paper 
Goold and Campbell’s (1987) research on the role of corporate headquarters and how it adds 
value to subsidiaries through management approach, strategy, management philosophy, and 
                                              
6 The authors mention the definition of Zaller and Carmines (1980), which describes the content validity as: 
“fundamentally content validity concerns the extent to which a set of items taps the content of some domain of 
interest. To the degree that the items reflect the full domain of content they are said to be content-valid.” 
7 Shin and Stulz (1988) define the internal capital market efficient if (1) it gives priority in the allocation of funds to 
the segment with best investment opportunities.;(2) if it makes that segment’s investment less sensitive to its own 
cash flow; and (3) if the allocation of funds to a segment falls when other segments have better investment 
opportunities. 
8 She found that expanding focused firms are less productive after diversification than non-expanding focused firms.  
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individual personalities, is consistent with the empirical findings of the last 15 years: diversified 
firms seem to be much more complex than single-segment firms with fewer credit constraints. 
Moreover, there is a lack of consensus in the identification of standard indicators of relatedness, 
and from which type of data it should be computed. Because of this complexity, to study 
diversified firms by searching in general a “rule for riches” for single business segment or for 
highly relatedness portfolio of business segments may be misleading; in addition, the effect on 
diversification is not homogeneous across industries (Santalo and Becerra, 2008). It might be 
more appropriate to identify what performance pattern belongs to diversified firms and then 
how the internal capital market and the degree of relatedness among business segments affects 
it and to what extent. Intuitively, in order to study when diversification creates or destroys 
value, it seems more appropriate to take inspiration from the performance pattern of private 
equity funds (LBO). Under this view, with few exceptions, like the investment time horizon, the 
legal structure or personnel policies, both private equity and diversified firms have strong 
similarities: (i) both models of firms follow a value maximization behavior; (ii) target poor 
performing companies; (iii) possess higher management capabilities than single segment firms 
to improve productivity; (iv) transfer knowledge management among business segments; and 
(v) finally benefit from high availability of funds for investments from both internal and 
external sources. 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), studying private equity LBO performance, find specific performance 
patterns of LBO compared to mutual funds: “on average” the risk-adjusted performance of LBO 
is slightly less than the market index, but in opposition with mutual funds in which persistence 
of return has been difficult to detect, LBO funds that outperform the market also show a 
substantial risk-adjusted strong performance persistence. In addition, top performing LBO show 
a concave relationship with fund rising
9 and they choose to raise less capital than they could, 
most likely because of the limited scalability of other inputs like human capital skills such as 
time and advice. 
A similar performance pattern (a persistent performance) is expected within the population of 
diversified firms. This research does not aim to determine if “on average” the diversification 
creates or destroys value or what type relatedness is better for shareholder value, but to show 
that diversification might be a consistent strategy to create a persistent shareholder value and 
to try to explain this performance pattern through internal efficient funds allocation and the 
degree of relatedness among business segments. The research aims therefore to demonstrate 
that (i) there exists a persistence in performance heterogeneity among diversified by measuring 
the shareholder value creation of diversified firms using alternative methods than the excess 
value methodology and (ii) to measure the impact of the efficient internal capital market and of 
the degree of relatedness of segments in the explanation of the persistence of outstanding 
performance and shareholder value creation. 
This paper is organized in the following manner: Section 1 tests the persistence of performance 
heterogeneity among diversified firms through different econometrics indicators, and tests for 
the presence of firms’ specific effects; Section 2 classifies diversified firms into 3 classes (upper 
tercile, medium tercile, lower tercile) according to their performance measure through their 
Markov conditional probability to remain in the same performance tercile or to migrate to the 
                                              
9 The authors explain that top performer funds, by growing relatively less rapidly than the market on a performance 
basis adjusted, avoid moving into regions or investment of diminishing returns: mediocre performing funds grow 
proportionally faster than the top funds.  
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other two terciles; Section 3 computes and compares the market shareholder value for the top 
and lower tercile of diversified firms according to the risk and return indicators, the Jensen’s 
alpha and the Fama and French’s three factors model; Section 4 attempts to explain the reasons 
of the difference and persistence of performance using the instrumental variables (IV) system 
GMM dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Independent variables are developed to 
represent (i) the “efficiency” of the internal capital market according to Shin and Stulz (1998), 
and (ii) the degree of relatedness of the segments’ portfolio of the diversified using entropy 
indicators (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Papelu, 1985), Herfindahl index and count-of-the 
industry indicators constructed on the NAICS code rather than the SIC code. NAICS code 
classification has been introduced in 1987 in response to the criticisms of the SIC classification, 
and they have been developed under a production-oriented or supply-based conceptual 
framework, implying that similar production process will be grouped together; in addition, the 
NAICS classification takes into consideration new end emerging industries. Within each section 
of the paper the findings are discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
Data and Sample Selection 
The new segment reporting standard SFAS 131 was issued by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Boards (FASB) in June 1997 and is effective for fiscal years commencing after 
December 15, 1997. According to the SFAS 131, a firm needs to report disaggregated 
information by line of business unless they organize themselves that way for purposes of 
performance evaluation. In addition, the information provided under the new standard about 
segment definition would be less subjective than what was provided under the previous SFAS 
14, and it induces companies to more fully reveal their diversification and fund transfer 
strategies hence reflecting any underlying agency problem (Berger and Hann, 2003). A sample 
of 164 diversified firms with turnovers higher than $1 billion taken from Compustat Industry 
Segment (CIS) during the 1999-2006 period is examined. The length of this time series (8 years) 
is justified by the aim of the research question, which is to compare diversified firms that 
remained diversified during the entire time period. A longer time series (e.g. 15-20 years) may 
introduce potential self-selection biases given that poor performing diversified firms may 
choose to refocus into one business as an improving performance strategy (Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery, 1988), leaving the sample with only good performing multibusiness firms. Firms 
that refocus and remain refocused are not taken into consideration, and because of the research 
question, multi-business firms that miss one or more year data are not included into the 
sample. To compare to other studies, firms belonging to agriculture (SIC 100-900), regulated 
industry (SIC 4900-4999), financial services (SIC 6000-6900) and SIC 8888, (depositary receipts) 
SIC 9721 (International affair) and SIC 9995 (non-operating establishment) are excluded. Multi-
segment firms may not fully allocate accounting items to their reported business segments. This 
lack of consistency in reporting may induce a problem with the use of business segment data. It 
is therefore adopted the Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention of requiring that the sum of 
segment sales (assets) be within 1% (25%) of the consolidated firm total reported in the 
Compustat. For those firms meeting the above criteria, it is then explicitly allocated any 
unallocated assets: for example if firm level assets are 10% smaller (larger) than the sum of the 
segment assets, then each segment’s assets are reduced (increased) by 10%. Moreover, the 
corporate segment data (sales, assets, capital expenditure, operating income and depreciation) is 
allocated to the segments on an asset-weighted basis. These adjustments should decrease the 
shortcomings highlighted by Berger and Hann (2003) in the use of SFAS 131. Because the  
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excess value methodology is not used, in contrast to the literature in finance, firms that have 
segments in the financial industry or in a regulated industry are not dropped altogether, just 
that particular segment is dropped from the analysis. Around 13 companies of the sample have 
activities in the financial industry; most of the time the financial segment is a profitable 
activity (and not sophisticated) of credit and leasing given the interest spread between the cost 
of debt of the diversified firms and the lending interest. Hence, dropping these types of firms 
may introduce a bias in the sample selection given that diversified firms enjoy greater debt 
capacity, lower cost of debt, and debt tax shield relative to single segment firm due to lower 
risks (Lewellen, 1971; Mansi and Reeb, 2002). 
Section 1: Identification of Performance Measurements and 
Persistence of Performance Heterogeneity 
Variables 
In order to compare performance of firms with segments in different industries with different 
industry specific performance, the performance indicator used here is the outstanding 
performance (outstanding with the meaning of above the industry average): a firm that has the 
sum of the asset-weighted average of the outstanding performance of its segments positive is 
considered outstanding. There are three indicators of performance: OROA, OSALES/ASSETS, 
and OOP/SALES  that  measure performance in ROA, sales and operating profits relative to 
industry averages, respectively: 
 
1) OROAit =  
 
With ROAjit representing the ROA of the industry j defined at 6 digit NAICS code of the 
segment of firm i during period t and with ROAindjt representing the asset-weighted average 
ROA of the same industry j during period t. Ajit /Ait represents the portion of the asset of 
segment j within firm i during period t. In order to compute a consistent benchmark ROAindjt, 
following the previous literature in finance for the computation of the excess value 
methodology (Berg and Ofek, 1995), at least 5 segments with the same industry defined at 6 
digits NAICS code are required. If this condition is not fulfilled, the industry is then defined at 
5 digits NAICS code and the following 4 digits NAICS code until this conditions is fulfilled. 
With the same logic as the OROAit, the other two additional indicators of performance are 
constructed: the ratio sales/assets and the ratio operating profit/sales: 
 
2) OSALES/ASSETSit =  
 
with SALESindjt/ASSETindjt that represent the asset-weighted average SALES/ASSET ratio of 





j jit it indjt
SALES SALES A
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3) OOP/SALESit  =  
 
with OPindjt/ASSETindjt that represents the asset-weighted average operating profit/sales ratio 
of the same industry j during period t. 
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics of the three performance indicators. On average, 
diversified firms do not underperform their industry for all the three indicators of performance. 
Table I 
Descriptive Statistics of the Performance Indicators 
Three measures of performance are developed: outstanding ROA (OROA), outstanding 
Sales/Assets (OSALES/ASSETS) and outstanding Operating Profit/Sales (OOP/SALES). They 
allow comparing the performance of diversified firms in different industry assessing if the 
segments of a diversified firm performs below or above industry averages. From the descriptive 
statistics, it is possible to observe that, on average, diversified firms neither outperform nor 
underperform their industries, but rather are close to 0. In contrast, the value of the standard 
deviation indicates that there is an important variability around the average, and that the 
average value is probably not the most important measure when looking at the performance of 
diversified firms. 
Performance indicator  Mean     Std. Dev. 
OROA -0.0053985    0.0729536 
OSALES /ASSETS  0.0193536    1.0492040 
OOP/SALES -0.0009245    0.2293588 
 
Test of persistent performance 
To test the persistence of the performance, first we used an autoregressive model AR(1) like: 
Yit = α + βYi(t-1) + (ηi + vit) 
We tested according to several econometric measurements. Yit is the observation of the 
performance indicators of firm i in period t; Yit-1 is the performance of the previous period; ηi 
is the stochastic unobserved firm-specific time invariant effect which allows for heterogeneity 
in the means of the Yit,; and vit is the error component and α is the constant term. The value of 
β is estimated using different econometric measurements and the Hausman test (null hypothesis 
E[Yit ηi] = 0) is performed. 
Table II 
Autoregressive Model AR(1) and Hausman Test for Fixed Effect 
To test the persistence of performance, an autoregressive model AR(1) such as Yit = α + βYi(t-
1) + (ηi + vit) is tested according to several econometric measurements. To select the most 
efficient econometric model, the Hausman test (null hypothesis E[Yit ηi] = 0) is performed to 
assess the presence of a firm’s time invariant specific effect. For all three performance 
indicators, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis, hence the pooled OLS is rejected and 




j jit it indjt
OP OPA
x
SALES SALES A =
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
− ∑ 
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Least Squared (2SLS), developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). For the three performance 
indicators of OROA, OSALES/ASSETS and OOP/SALES, there is empirical evidence of 
persistence of performance. 
 
  Pooled OLS  Within Group  Instrumental Variables 2SLS 
OROA 0.7311*  0.2852*  0.3760* 
Adjusted R²  0.44  0.1157   
    
 Hausman  test  (WG/GLS)  χ2= 250.95* 
 
     
OSALES/ASSET    0.8544*  0.4887*  1.109* 
Adjusted R²  0.8142*  0.2507*   
 Hausman  test  (WG/GLS)  χ2 = 236.39* 
 
     
OOP/SALES    0.3421*  -0.0570††  0.2213† 
Adjusted R²  0.10**   0.0032††   
   Hausman test (WG /BG)  χ2= 366.68* 
 
*p < 0.001   **p < 0.01   †p < 0.1   ††p < 0.5 
 
Table II demonstrates that all the autoregressive models AR(1) show a consistent value of β, 
which confirms the hypothesis of a consistent persistence performance for all three performance 
indicators. In addition, the rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test represents an 
additional indication of the correlation between the performance Yit and firm time invariant 
specific effect ηi. The correlation between Yit and ηi indicates that the consistent estimation of 
β is represented only by model 3 through the autoregressive first difference, Two-Stage Least 
Squared (2SLS) developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), in which the firm-specific effect is 
eliminated, hence the estimator is consistent. As suggested by Bond (2002) and Arellano (2003),  
model 1, AR(1) through pooled OLS is inconsistent and biased upwards since the explanatory 
variable Yit-1 is positive correlated with the error term (ηi + vit) due to the presence of the firm 
time invariant specific effect ηi. Model 2, the Within Group estimator, eliminates the sources of 
inconsistency by transforming the equation to eliminate the firm time invariant specific effect 
ηi; however, this transformation introduces a negative correlation of order 1/(t-1) between the 
transformed lagged dependent variables and the transformed error term, suggesting that except 
for time series with t is bigger or equal 15 (Arellano, 2003), the Within Group estimator is 
biased downwards and hence not efficient. In section 4, an additional consistent and more 
efficient indicator of β than the Two-Stage Least Squared (2SLS) is computed following an IV 
system GMM dynamic panel data. 
Section 2: Diversified Firms Class Composition 
In order to confirm the persistence of performance and to calculate the creation and/or 
destruction of shareholder value, all diversified firms are sorted into performance terciles. The 
Markov conditional probability indicates that a multi-business firm will either stay in the same 
performance tercile, or move into one of the other two terciles with equal probabilities. For all 
three performance indicators, persistence at both ends of the distribution is found. 
  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 13 
Table III 
Markov Conditional Probability 
In order to move from the persistence of performance measured through accounting data, to 
measurement of market value in terms of creation and/or destruction of shareholder value, all 
diversified firms are sorted into performance terciles and the Markov conditional probability 
that indicates that a multi-business firm will either stay in the same performance tercile or 
move into one of the other two terciles. For all three performance indicators, strong empirical 
evidence is found of the persistence at both ends of the distribution. The figures below allow 
constructing top tercile and lower tercile portfolios of diversified firms, and calculating their 
performance in terms of risk and return. 
 
OROA 
  Top Tercile (%)  Medium Tercile (%)  Lower Tercile (%) 
Top Tercile  72  21  7 
Medium Tercile  22  52  26 
Lower Tercile  7  28  65 
      
OSALES/ASSETS 
  Top Tercile (%)  Medium Tercile (%)  Lower Tercile (%) 
Top Tercile  78  16  6 
Medium Tercile  19  59  22 
Lower Tercile  6  22  72 
      
OOP/SALES 
  Top Tercile (%)  Medium Tercile (%)  Lower Tercile (%) 
Top Tercile  72  19  9 
Medium Tercile  22  58  20 
Medium Tercile  9  24  67 
 
For all the three performance indicators, diversified firms in the top (and bottom) terciles have 
at least a 65% chance of remaining in those terciles, and at most a 9% chance of moving to the 
bottom (and top) tercile. This result on the Markov conditional probability allows measuring the 
shareholder value creation and destruction of diversified firms, and especially its persistence 
without using the excess value methodology (Berg and Ofek, 1995). Two portfolios with shares 
of firms that belong to the distribution tail and that persistently remain in that particular 
distribution tail during the 1999-2006 time series are constructed: for every year two portfolios 
are built, one portfolio contains shares of the firms that belong to the top tercile, and the other 
portfolio contains shares of the firms that belong to the lower tercile. 
For all performance indicators, the Markov conditional probability indicates a strong 
persistence of performance, but in order to select the most representative indicator of 
outstanding performance and construct more representative portfolios of top and lower terciles, 
each indicator of outstanding performance constructed in section 1 is regressed against firm’s 
Tobin’s  q. Table IV indicates that the OROA indicator has the higher correlation value in 
comparison to other two indicators defined in section 1. This is also confirmed by the value of 
the correlation between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the level of simple assets weighted average 
ROA of the firm. 
  
14 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Table IV 
Simple Regression Among Outstanding Performance Variables and Tobin’s q 
Table III shows that, for all three indicators of performance, the Markov conditional 
probability shows strong empirical evidence. In order to select the more appropriate 
performance indicators to construct portfolios of top and lower terciles, each indicator is 
regressed against the Tobin’s q in comparison to the other two indicators, OSALES/ASSETS 
and OOP/SALES. The following table shows that the OROA has a higher correlation with the 
Tobin’s q, hence the portfolios of top and lower diversified firms will be built according to 
the ranking on the OROA indicators. 
 
  OSALES/ASSETS OOP/SALES  OROA  Tobin’s  q ROA 
OSALES/ASSETS 1         
OOP/SALES 0.0028  1       
OROA 0.1352  0.0646  1     
Tobin’s q  0.0284 0.0127  0.2248  1   
ROA 0.0878  0.0420  0.6504  0.3379  1 
Section 3: Portfolio Performance, Risk and Shareholder Value 
Given some of the criticisms of the excess value methodology (Campa and Kedia, 2002; 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a, 2004b; Emms 
and Kale, 2006; Stowe and Xing, 2006) it would seem more appropriate to compute the creation 
or destruction of shareholder value in a different way. Based on the results of Sections 1 and 2, 
which indicate a persistence of the performance among multi-business firms, for every year two 
portfolios are constructed according to the OROA indicator of performance, the first portfolio 
with firms that belong to the top tercile and the second portfolio with firms that belong to the 
lower tercile. The Markov conditional probability of Table III, which shows a 72% probability of 
a top tercile firm remaining within the same group and a 65% probability of a lower tercile firm 
remaining within the same group, will give a good consistency of the results based on these 
portfolios. 
Two equally balanced portfolios ($1 invested in each firm) are constructed and the return to 
shareholders is evaluated. 
Risk and total return 
For each portfolio and for every year, the total return of the portfolio and its standard deviation 
(σ) as measurement of risk is computed. Table V shows that the portfolio built on the top tercile 
has a statistically significant higher performance than the portfolio constructed on the lower 
tercile: over six years, the top tercile portfolio outperforms lower the tercile portfolio with equal 
return and lower risk, with higher return and equal risk, or with higher return and lower risk. 
During the last two years, the positive difference between top and lower terciles portfolios is 
not statistically significant. 
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Table V 
Shareholder Value of Top and Lower Terciles: Total Return and Standard Deviation 
Based on the empirical evidence of the Markov conditional probability, for each top and 
lower tercile, and for every year a portfolio is constructed, the total return of the portfolio 
and its standard deviation (σ) as measurement of risk is computed. At the bottom of the table, 
the difference in performance and risk between the two portfolios and its statistical 
significance at 95% (t statistics indicated in brackets) is computed, as well as the statistical 
significance (p value) of the inequality of the standard deviations (σ) as measurement of risk. 
The financial performance of top tercile portfolio is superior and statistically significant to 
the lower tercile portfolio during the 1999-2004 period (higher return and same risk, same 
return and lower risk, or higher return and lower risk). For the last two years (2005-2006), the 
higher return and lower risk of the top tercile portfolio does not reach the statistical 
significance requested. 
 
  1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
TOP TERCILE   
Total  return  5.31  3.56  10.29  -8.00 32.68 23.15 14.65 14.97 
Standard deviation(σ)  13.04 17.71  22.03 16.98 12.89 12.07 12.40 12.82 
LOWER TERCILE   
Total  return  3.28 -4.30  5.56  -21.05 33.55 14.35 11.75 11.35 
 Standard deviation(σ)  16.36 17.36  25.95 19.29 17.39 14.41 13.22 14.56 
∆(TOP - LOWER)   
















Standard deviation(σ)  -3.32* 0.35 -3.92** -2.31 -4.5*  -2.34** -0.82 -1.74 
*p < 0.05  **p < 0.10 
 
Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1969) measures the systematic risk-adjusted excess return with respect 
to a selected market of reference according to the formula: 
Rp – Rf =  βp (Rm-Rf) + Alpha 
Αlpha = Rp – βp (Rm-Rf) - Rf 
Rp represents the return of the top and lower tercile portfolio’s return; Rf is the riskfree rate, 
Rm is the market returm and βp is the covariance of the portfolio’s returns scaled by the 
variance of the return on the market. 
The Jensen’s alpha is computed according to two markets of reference (market indexes): the 
Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500 Composite. The data is taken on weekly basis, which 
yields 52 observations per year.  
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From Table VI it is possible to conclude that the difference and persistence of performance 
found in Section 1 is reflected as well at shareholder value level. The difference of the Jensen’s 
alpha between the top tercile portfolio and the lower tercile portfolio is always positive. 
Comparing the performance of the two portfolios with the market performance through the 
Jensen’s alpha, with the exceptions for the years 1999 (Jensen’s alpha with negative value) and 
2006 (Jensen’s alpha close to 0), the top tercile portfolio consistently and constantly beat the 
market, while the lower tercile portfolio has a consistent negative value of α during four years 
over the period. This result shows that if “on average” a diversified firm destroys value (Lang 
and Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995), taking into consideration the persistence of 
performance, top tier diversified firms show “on average” a strong and persistent shareholder 
value creation. 
Fama and French Three Factors Model 
To attain a deeper understanding of the returns and the type and characteristics of firms that 
belong to the two portfolios, each portfolio is regressed against the Fama & French three factors 
model for every year of the time series. This multifactor model was motivated by the empirical 
finding that size (SMB) and the ratio of book to market equity (HML) have consistent and 
significant explanatory power of stock returns (Fama and French, 1992). 
The Fama and French three factors model follows this formula: 
Rp = Rf + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML 
with: 
Factor Rm-Rf: market premium, equal to the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964). This measurement allows 
comparing the systematic risk known as the market risk, or the risk that cannot be diversified 
away, not specific to individual stock, for both portfolios. 
Factor SMB: It stands for Small Minus Big. This factor accounts for “size premium” and 
conditionally it is also related to profitability (Fama and French, 1992). It is designed to 
measure the additional return investors have historically received by investing in stocks of 
companies with relative small market capitalization. Logically, this factor is expected to be 
more sensitive to many risk factors as a result of their relatively undiversified nature and their 
reduced ability to absorb negative financial stock. Fama and French (1992) notice that the 
recession of 1981 and 1982 turns into a prolonged earning depression for small stocks and for 
some reason, they notice that on average small stocks do not participate in the boom of the 
middle and late 1980s. 
Factor HML: It stands for High Minus Low. This factor accounts for “value premium” and it is 
more related to profitability than the SMB factor (Fama and French, 1992). It is designed to 
measure the additional return provided to investors for investing in companies with high book-
to-market values. Fama and French (1995) show that book-to-market equity and the slope on 
HML proxy for relative for distress: weak firms with persistently low earnings tend to have high 
BE/ME (book equity market equity ratio) and positive slope on HMT, while strong firms with 
persistently high earnings have low (BE/ME) and negative slope to HML. 
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Table VII shows the results. 
Table VII 
Fame and French Three Factors Model 
Based on the empirical evidence of the Markov conditional probability, for each top and lower 
tercile and for every year a portfolio is constructed and regressed against the Fama and French 
three factors model, according to the formula Rp = Rf + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML. The results 
below show the following: according to the first factor of Fama and French (the marker index), 
top tier portfolio of diversifiers show a lower systematic risk than lower tier diversifiers. The 
second factor, SMB, represents the “premium size,” designed to measure the additional return 
investors have historically received because of the sensitive nature of small capitalization to 
many risk factors as a result of their relatively undiversified nature and their reduced ability to 
absorb negative financial stock. The results show that during the entire time series (1999-2006) 
the lower tercile portfolio shows greater correlation than the top tercile portfolio. Given that in 
our sample only diversified firms with turnovers greater than $1 billion have been included, it 
is possible to conclude that lower tercile have a lower diversification or a strong “relatedness 
diversification” in terms of cash flow volatility, while top tercile portfolio seems to contains 
more unrelated diversification in terms of cash flow volatility. The third factor, HML, account 
for “value premium” and it is more related to profitability than the SMB factor (Fama and 
French, 1992). It is designed to measure the additional return provided to investors for 
investing in companies with high book-to-market values. The result of the regression confirms 
the result of Table V and VI: top tercile portfolio consistently outperforms the lower tercile 
portfolio. 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005  2006 
TOP TERCILE   
R²  0.69 0.71 0.91 0.89 0.86  0.88  0.94  0.88 
b(Market)  0.99* 0.83* 1.00  0.93* 0.81*  0.95*  0.95*  0.95* 
s(SMB)  0.50* -0.16*  0.35* 0.17* 0.17*  0.16*  0.65  0.43* 
h(HLM)  0.80* 0.52* 0.55* 0.29* 0.10**  0.21*  0.43**  0.07** 
LOWER TERCILE   
R²  0.79 0.65 0.94 0.83 0.82*  0.89  0.91  0.89 
b(Market)  1.36* 0.86* 1.24* 1.07* 1.07*  1.08*  1.04*  1.03* 
s(SMB)  0.62* 0.04* 0.85* 0.55* 0.34**  0.29*  0.77*  0.60* 
h(HLM)  1.23* 0.87* 1.09* 0.72* 0.42  0.05*  0.16*  0.15** 
∆(TOP - LOWER)   
b(Market)  -0.37 -0.03 -0.24 -0.14 -0.26  -0.13  -0.09  -0.08 
s(SMB)  -0.12 -0.20 -0.5  -0.38 -0.17  -0.13  -0.12  -0.17 
h(HLM)  -0.43 -0.35 -0.54 -0.43 -0.32  0.16  0.27  -0.08 
*p < 0.001  †p < 0.10  **p < 0.2 
For all three factors of the Fama and French model, coefficients related to the top terciles 
portfolio are smaller than the lower tercile portfolio for almost the entire 1999-2006 time series. 
The first factor from the model, the CAPM bi(Rm-Rf) shows that the portfolio constructed on 
the top tercile shows a lower systematic risk than the portfolio constructed on the lower tercile.  
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Figure I 
Systematic Risk (β): Top Tercile and Lower Tercile 
Based on the empirical evidence of the Markov conditional probability for each top and lower 
tercile and for every year a portfolio is constructed and regressed against the Fama and French 
three factors model according to the formula Rp = Rf + bi(Rm-Rf) + siSMB +hiHML. According 
to the first factor of Fama and French (the marker index), top tercile portfolio of diversifiers 













The second factor from the model siSMB represents the “size premium,” which indicates the 
additional return investors have historically received by investing in stocks of companies with 
relative small market capitalization given their reduced ability to absorb negative financial 
stock, explained also by their lower degree of diversification which increases cash flow 
volatility. The sample of diversified firms included only diversifiers that have a sales turnover 
of at least $1 billion every year, hence small capitalization should not have been included. 
However, when comparing siSMB within the top tercile compared to the lower tercile (Figure II) 
it is possible to affirm that, without analyzing the degree of relatedness among business 
segments, diversified firms that belong to the lower terciles have more small-capitalization 
characteristics than diversified firms that belong to the top terciles, especially in term of cash 
flow volatility. This finding also provides information on the degree of segment relatedness: 
under the assumption that the degree of earning relatedness is positively correlated to the 
degree of segment relatedness, the more related the segments are, the lower the performance of 
the diversified firm. 
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Figure II 
Fama and French SMB Factor: Top Tercile and Lower Tercile 
The figure below indicates the coefficient siSMB of the Fama and French 3 factor models of 
both portfolio of top tercile and lower tercile during the 1999-2006 time series. Lower tercile 
portfolio is consistently higher than the top tercile portfolio, suggesting that lower tercile firms 
compared to the top tercile firms possess more characteristics of medium-size firms, such as: 














The third factor from the model siHML represents the “value premium,” which is more related 
to profitability than the SMB factor (Fama and French, 1992). The lower coefficients found for 
the top tercile portfolio, in comparison of the lower tercile portfolio, confirm the previous 
findings in the risk return and Jensen’s alpha analyses: top tercile portfolio possess higher 
performance compared to the lower tercile, and in two years the value of the slope for top 
tercile is negative while always positive for the lower tercile portfolio. 
The comparison of the values of (i) the risk and total return, (ii) the Jensen’s alpha, and (iii) the 
HML factor of the Fama and French model confirms that the persistent outstanding 
performance is also present through market-based indicators. These results also confirm the 
accounting performance measure OROA used to construct top and lower portfolios. 
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Section 4: Outstanding Performance, Efficient Internal Capital 
Market and Degree of Relatedness Among Business Segments 
Findings in Sections 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate that some multi-business firms continuously 
outperform and create a positive shareholder value compared to the market. As explained in the 
review of financial literature, the main justification for the diversification discount among 
diversified firms is mainly driven by the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market; the 
diversification discount is mainly explained by a motivation of misallocation of internal funds 
of destruction of cash flow where higher profitable segments subvention lower profitable 
segments. In contrast to the strategy field, the literature focuses the explanation of the 
outperforming or underperforming multi-business firms mainly on the degree or relatedness 
among business segments, or by the ability to develop synergies among businesses. 
This section attempts to explain, using panel data, the outstanding performance (OROA) 
through independent variables that represent (i) the degree of efficiency of the internal capital 
market according to the conditions of efficiency of Shin and Stulz (1998) and (ii) the degree of 
segments’ relatedness of the diversified firm. 
Econometric model selection and development 
The selection of the econometrics model needs to take into account two critical considerations: 
(i) the presence of the time invariant firm’s specific effect ηi,, given that in Section 1 the 
Hausman test shows that E[Yit ηi]  ≠ 0; and (ii) the length of the eight-year time series (1999-
2006) which makes the standard candidate in case presence of ηi, (the Within Group indicator) 
inefficient because of the negative correlation of order 1/(t-1) between the transformed lagged 
dependent variables and the transformed error term. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest, for a 
mean stationary process where  E[∆Yit ηi] = 0, using the dynamic panel data model with the 
instrumental variables (IV) system generalized method of moments (GMM) that eliminates firm’s 
specific effect and gives efficient value of parameters for large sample and limited time series. 
In addition, this econometric model allows the researcher to attempt to manage the endogeneity 
related to the independent variables with the use of longer lags as instruments when needed. 
The sample selected is composed by large multi-business firms with turnovers greater than 
$1,000, hence it is correct to assume that the delta performance ∆Yit of the firms in the sample 
selected follows a mean stationary process. 
The static econometric model is 
Yit = βiXit + (ηi + vit)             (1) 
Where Yit is the outstanding ROA (OROA) indicator that has been used to build the two 
portfolios of top and lower terciles in Section 3, Xit  are the  independent variables that 
represent the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market and the degree of relatedness 
among business segments; ηi is the stochastic unobserved firm-specific time invariant effect; 
and vit is the error component or disturbance term, for simplification of writing the constant 
term is omitted. Consistent estimation of βi  requires that the static equation in (1) is 
transformed into a dynamic representation. To do that, the equation in (1) at (t-1) is multiplied 
by α to get:  
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αYi(t-1) = αβiXi(t-1) + (αηi + αvi(t-1))  (2) 
Then, the difference between these two equations (1) and (2) is computed to obtain the new 
dynamic econometric equation under the following representation: 
Yit = αYi(t-1) + βiXit – αβiXi(t-1) + [(1-α) ηi + vit+ αvi(t-1)]     (3) 
This last equation (3) is the input equation used in the IV system GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). Through this dynamic representation, the value of α, which is the coefficient of the past 
performance, will be also estimated through a more efficient model than the 2SLS econometric 
measurement in Section 1, given that we have a time period greater than three years (Bond, 
2002; Arellano, 2003). 
Independent variables development 
Independent variables are developed to represent the efficiency of the internal capital market 
and the degree of relatedness among business segments. 
Efficient internal capital market 
Shin and Stulz (1998) develop three conditions for an efficient internal capital market: (i) it 
gives priority in the allocation of funds to the segments with best investment opportunities; (ii) 
the segment’s investment is less sensitive to its own cash flow as well as to other segments’ 
cash flows; and (iii) the allocation of funds to a segment falls when other segments have better 
investment opportunities. 
The first and third conditions deal with the firm’s performance hence, the following control 
variables are developed to test these conditions. 
a) To test the first condition, the allocation of funds to the best performing segments, the 
following indicators are developed: 
 
MAXMAXit =  
 
Where Ijit is the investment in segment j of the firm i in time t hence the positive of the results 
of the following formula
10: ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1). Using the same logic, 
DISjit is the disinvestment but has a negative value. In the denominator, the investments (Iit) 
minus the disinvestments (DISit) of the firm i during time t is considered because it aims to 
represent the whole amount of the investment and disinvestment decisions of the firm. The 
numerator only considers investments and disinvestments within segments that have both the 
ROA > assets weighted ROA of the firm i during period t as well as > the ROAindjt , which 
represents the asset-weighted average ROA of the industry j in which the segment operates 
during period t. 
                                              
10 The CAPEX field is not used as indicator of investment because it misses important components of the investments 
within diversified firms such as the acquisitions, which are a common investment strategy within diversified firms 
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MIMINit =  
 
Where Ijit is the investment in segment j of the firm i in time t hence the positive of the results 
of the following formula
11: ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1). With the same logic, 
DISjit is the disinvestment, but it has a negative value. In the denominator, the investments (Iit) 
minus the disinvestments (DISit) of the firm i during time t, is considered because it aims to 
represent the whole amount of the investment and disinvestment decisions of the firm. The 
numerator only considers investments and disinvestments within segments that have the ROA < 
assets weighted ROA of the firm i during period t and < the ROAindjt which represents the 
asset-weighted average ROA of the industry j in which the segment operates during period t. 
According to the first condition of internal capital market’s efficiency of Shin and Stulz (1998), 
it a positive coefficient of MAXMAX is expected (investment in highly performing segments 
with ROA above both the industry and firm’s average) and a negative coefficient of MINMIN 
(disinvestment in low performing segments with ROA below both the industry and firm’s 
average). Additional two intermediary independent variables are constructed MAXMIN 
(investments and disinvestments within segments that have the ROA > ROA of the firm i during 
period t but < ROAindjt) and  MINMAX (investments and disinvestments within segments that 
have the ROA < ROA of the firm i during period t but > ROAindjt), but given their construction, 
no significant statistical representation is expected from these two last independent variables. 
b) To test the third condition, the CFINV variable is developed, in which allocation to specific 
segments falls when other segments have better investment opportunities: 
 
CFINVit =                                                         which works according to the logic described  
in the variable CFGROWTHjit. 
 
CFGROWTHjit =  
which behaves according to the following logic: 
•  If CFGROWTHjit > 0 than                       of the segment j is computed in the numerator 
of CFINVit. 
•  If CFGROWTHjit < 0 than                         of the segment j is set to 0 in the numerator 
of CFINVit. 
Ijit is the investment in segment j of the firm i in time t, hence the positive results of the 
following formula: ASSETjit + DEPRECIATIONjit - ASSETji(t-1). With the same logic, DISjit is 
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the disinvestment but with a negative value. The denominator only considers the investments 
(Iit) minus the disinvestments (DISit) of the firm i during time t, because it aims to represent the 
whole amount of the investment and disinvestment decisions of the firm. 
CFGROWTH takes into consideration if investment and disinvestment decisions are efficient: a 
positive value of this indicator means that (i) an investment has been performed because the 
profitability of the segment under the formula [CFjit/Ajit] / [CFji(t-1)/Aji(t-1)] is higher 
 compared to the rest of the portfolio under the formula                                                        
or (ii) a disinvestment has been performed because the profitability of the segment is lower 
compared to the rest of the portfolio, while a negative value of CFGROWTH  indicates an 
opposite behavior, hence it is considered as an inefficient funds allocation. CF is the cash flow 
of the segment (the sum of the operating profit plus depreciation), –j represents the total 
segments of the firm minus the segment j, and (t-1) represents one lag period. A is the value of 
the assets allocated to the segment. 
According to the third condition of internal capital market’s efficiency of Shin and Stulz (1998), 
the value of CFINV tends to 1 (100% of the investment and disinvestment decisions are 
efficient). In contrast, within an inefficient internal capital market, the value of CFINV tends to 
0 (0% of the investment and disinvestment decisions are efficient). Overall, it is expected to 
have a positive correlation between the independent variable CFINV and the dependent variable 
OROA. 
Degree of segment relatedness 
Here, in order to assess the validity of the inverted-U curvilinear relationship between 
diversification and performance, the use of sophisticated indicators of relatedness that are able 
to tap into the degree of relatedness among business segments is not preferred, but they may 
ask scholars for a degree of subjectivity (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). The following indicators 
will be used: (i) Herfindahl index, (ii) simple count-of-industry approach, and (iii) entropy 
indicators (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Papelu, 1985). An additional argument for not using 
sophisticated indicators of relatedness is also motivated by the times series selected and the use 
of the NAICS codification. In the time series selected (1999-2006), segments’ information is 
disclosed according to the new segment reporting standard SFAS 131 in which the firm needs 
to report disaggregated information by line of business, unless they organize themselves that 
way for purposes of performance evaluation. Hence, it induces companies to more fully reveal 
their diversification and fund transfer strategies.  In addition, the information provided under 
the new standard about segment definition would be less subjective than what was provided 
under the previous SFAS 14 (Berger and Hann, 2003). Finally, the use of the NAICS code rather 
than the SIC code permits capturing a certain portion of the degree of relatedness among 
business segments because of their construction logic. 
The indicators are: 
 
HERFINDAHL INDEXit = 1-             where S = SALESjit /  
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DTit (Diversification Total entropy indicator of firm i in time t) =    
where       is the proportion of business (sales) of segment j defined at 6-digits NAICS code. 
DUit (Diversification Unrelated entropy indicator of firm i in time t) =                           where 
       is the proportion of business (sales) of segments  j  defined according to the first 3-digits 
NAICS code. 
DRit (Diversification Related entropy indicator of firm i in time t) = DTit – Duit. 
NBSEGit = Number of segments reported by firm i in time t. 
NBSECit = Number of subsectors defined at the first 3 digits of the NAICS code of firm i in time t. 
NBINDit = Number of industries defined at the first 4 digits of the NAICS code of firm i in time t. 
Moreover additional control variables are included as the leverage (LEVERAGE), log of assets 
(ASSETS) and dividend per share (DIVIDEND/SHARE). 
The results of the instrumental variables (IV) system GMM econometric models are shown in 
Table VIII.  
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All six models confirm a strong persistence of outstanding performance based on the 
outstanding ROA (OROA) indicator through coefficient βYit-1 within the interval [0,70 - 0,81], 
higher than the value found in Section 1 through the Anderson and Hsiao first difference 2SLS 
estimation (close to 0,40). The explanation of the past performance factor is much higher than 
(i) the degree of efficiency of the internal capital market (the coefficients βi for the independent 
variable MAXMAX is 0,028 and for MINMIN is -0,015), and (ii) the degree of relatedness 
among business segments (the coefficients βi for the independent variable NBSEC is between 
0,015 and 0,0248 and for NBSEG is between -0,012 and -0,0267). 
For all models, the values of the Sargan and Hansen tests as well as the Arellano Bond auto-
regression test AR(1) and AR(2) of the residuals [absent for AR(1) and insignificant for AR (2)] 
confirm the statistical validity of the econometric models. Moreover, all models control for 
heteroskedasticity. 
The findings confirm the first condition of the efficiency of the internal capital market: the 
allocation of funds to the best performing segment is a direct explanation of the persistence of 
the performance (independent variable MAXMAX), while the allocation to low performing 
segments is negatively correlated with performance (independent variable MINMIN). In 
contrast, the second condition of the efficiency of the internal capital market - the coefficient 
of CFINV - is statistically significant but with a negative sign: investing in high-performing 
segments in comparison to the rest of the segment portfolio is negatively correlated with the 
outstanding performance. There are several possible explanations for this result of CFINV: (i) 
obtaining an outstanding performance is a difficult task, and the correct direction of the 
investment to high-performing segments is not sufficient; (ii) Jensen’s (1986) agency cost of 
free cash flow argumentation, in which managers in high-performing firms invest in lower 
performing segments, but this hypothesis is not confirmed by the firm’s leverage variable 
(LEVERAGE); (iii) managers may invest with greater crtieria when the performance starts 
deteriorating; and (iv) in order to construct a variable to satisfy the third condition of the 
efficiency of the internal capital market, this independent variable only compares each segment 
with the rest of the portfolio without making any distinction between high- and low-
performing segments of the rest of the portfolio. 
In terms of the degree of relatedness of business segments, one may observe that both entropy 
indexes and the Herfindahl index do not reach a statistical significance to confirm the assumed 
inverted-U curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance. But in Models 4, 5 
and 6, a simple count(?) of the industry approach indicates that if the number of segments 
(independently of the number of industries) has a negative impact of performance, contrarily 
the number of industries in which a firm operates has a positive correlation with performance. 
This last finding (positive correlation between number of industries defined at the first 3 digits 
NAICS code and outstanding performance) is also confirmed by the finding described in Section 
III, when regressing the top tercile and lower tercile of diversified firms to the SMB factors of 
Fama and French three factors model. The top tercile seems to have lower cash flow volatility, 
hence lower covariance of its cash flow in comparison to the lower tercile. Therefore, by adding 
the findings in Section III with the findings in Section IV, it is possible to conclude that the top 
tercile may have a certain degree of unrelated diversification in their portfolio of segments, 
hence the assumed inverted-U curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance 
is not confirmed. 
Another possible explanation of the business relatedness pattern described above might be 
suggested by the empirical findings of Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a), in  
28 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
which the “diversification discount” is mainly driven by endogeneity when firms choose a 
diversification strategy as a path to move from declining industry. Hence, they still perform 
poorly while within highly and unrelated diversified firms, and the diversification is a path to 
develop profitable new business opportunities through consolidated and tested procedures for 
the allocation of internal funds and management of the business segments. 
Finally, by comparing the explanatory power of the past performance (controlling for firm’s 
specific effects) to the other independent variables, it is possible to conclude that the positive 
relationship between diversification and performance goes far beyond the simple explanation of 
an efficient internal capital market or a certain degree of relatedness among business segments. 
This suggests that, in order to study the relationship between diversification and performance, 
more complete models that include firm’s strategies, corporate entrepreneurship behavior and 
management skills should be taken into consideration. 
Finally, to improve the significance of the results found in the econometric models, for all 
dependent and independent variables of the top and lower terciles, we test two independent 
means for inequality with Student’s t test.  
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Compared to lower tercile, top-tercile diversified firms have statistically significant higher value 
for the three industry adjusted indicators of performance during the whole time series: OROA 
(range from 11.28% to 13.51%); OASSETS/SALES (range from 29.45% to 52.33%); and 
OOP/SALES (range from 7.05% to 23.28%).  Similar results are found at the firm’s average ROA 
(range from 8.67% to 11.06%). 
We find a statistically significant confirmation for the first condition of the efficient internal 
capital market: top-tercile firms allocate more funds in segments with higher investments 
opportunities (MAXMAX with range from 19.9% to 35.9%) while lower terciles firms invest 
more in poor performing segments (MINMIN - top tercile minus lower tercile - with range from 
-14.5% to -28.4%). The means’ comparison of the indicator CFINV, representing the third 
condition of the efficient internal capital market, is not statistically significant. 
Finally, both terciles do not have a statistically significant means’ difference (tstat < 1.9599) for 
the degree of relatedness among business segments. This indicates, as found previously in the 
econometrics models, that inverted-U curvilinear relationship between diversification and 
performance is not confirmed. 
Section 5: Conclusion and Direction for Future Research 
Without attempting to answer the classical research questions in finance and strategic 
management (if a business segment is better off within a diversified firm or alone, and looking 
for a “content valid” indicator of business relatedness to explain the linkage diversification and 
performance), but rather measuring shareholder value based on the empirical findings of an 
important persistence of performance among diversified firms, this research found that some 
diversified firms create a persistent shareholder value as well as beating the market index. 
Similar to private equity funds, diversified firms show similar performance pattern: some 
diversified firms persistently outperform their peers and the market by creating a substantial 
shareholder value while others constantly underperform. 
An efficient internal capital market explains some of the outstanding performance, but it is 
limited compared to the past performance. Important insights for future research may be drawn 
from the results that attempt to answer the question of how the persistence of outstanding 
performance is related to the degree of relatedness among business segments: the inverted-U 
curvilinear relationship is not confirmed. In contrast, these results indicated that diversified 
firms with segments in different unrelated industries, defined at 3 digits NAICS code and with 
lower correlation among segment’s earnings, seems to benefit from higher and persistent 
performance. It is possible to conclude that (i) diversification creates a persistent shareholder 
value for these types of firms that are able to develop and manage the process of diversification 
strategy, and that (ii) this persistence of outstanding performance goes far beyond the degree of 
efficiency in the funds allocation process and the degree of relatedness among business 
segments. 
The results of this research indicate that the study of the linkage between diversification and 
performance future research should be oriented in the development of additional indicators at 
both management and diversification strategy path development levels in order to test to what 
extent the explanation of the outstanding performance pattern of diversified firm resides within 
the firm’s strategy and management capabilities.  
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